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Self-Silencing and Online Learning
Cass R. Sunstein

1.
A number of years ago, I found myself in a group of about eight people, at
a large party, with one of the world’s great athletes. The conversation flagged
a bit, and I chimed in with a question I had long wanted to ask a professional
athlete: “If the game is almost over, and if your team is losing, and if all the
pressure is on you, and if everything depends on how you perform—are you having fun?” He looked me right in the eye, and then he scanned the small group,
and said this: “Absolutely! I was trained for that; I live for that! You ask if I am
having fun when the game is on the line—are you kidding? Of course! I love it!”
About an hour later, I was near a corner of the room, all by myself, and not far
away there was the athlete, also standing by himself. I called him over, looked
up (he’s tall), and said very quietly, “Your answer to my question really surprised
me. I play a little sport myself, called squash, and I know some of the strongest
players, and I don’t think they would have given that answer. Is it really true?”
He smiled and said, “You want to hear the real answer? You asked if I am
having fun when all the pressure is on me, and the game is on the line, and
there’s not much time left. Fun? God, no! It’s awful. There’s a ton of pressure,
and it’s on my shoulders.” Then he paused. “Don’t get me wrong. I know what
to do. I’m trained for it. I’m good at it. But fun? Not at all!”
(I am not disclosing his name, because he trusted me.)
A second story is from Saudi Arabia. By custom, husbands usually have the
final word on whether their wives join the labor force. Not long ago, researchers
found that the overwhelming majority of young married men in Saudi Arabia
are privately in favor of female labor force participation.1 At the same time,
they think that the level of support among other young men is low (including
their own neighbors). The researchers randomly corrected those beliefs. The
correction had significant effects. Four months afterward, the wives of men whose beliefs
were corrected were more likely to have applied and interviewed for jobs outside of the home.
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Both of these stories are about self-silencing, and about the pressures imposed
by social norms. It is expected, and slightly heroic, for a great athlete to say that
he likes the pressure of the last moments of a game. It is not heroic, and might
become a newspaper story, if a great athlete says that he dislikes that pressure.
If young men in Saudi Arabia learn that most of their peers think that it is
just fine if their wives work outside of the home, then they are more likely to
say that very thing to their wives. As a result, female labor force participation
increases significantly.
Self-silencing is everywhere. It certainly occurs in law school classrooms.
Some students might have convictions that they believe to be unpopular.
They might be right of center. They might be left of center. They might have
strong religious convictions. They might have beliefs that are difficult to map
in standard ideological terms. They might be people of color. But because of
their belief that their views are out of step with those of their peers, they might
silence themselves. In producing censorship, social norms can do some of the
work of law. It has become common to speak of “preference falsification,” which
occurs when people speak falsely about their wants and desires.2 Self-silencing
can indeed lead to preference falsification, but it is a much broader concept.
People might speak falsely or be silent about their approach to law, their values,
their emotional states (very broadly speaking), and their experiences. Christian
students might not speak about their faith. Women might not reveal experiences
of sexual abuse. Believers in gun rights, or skeptics about affirmative action,
might shut up.
2.
Consider a small experiment in democracy that I conducted with some
colleagues a number of years ago.3 We brought about sixty American citizens
together and assembled them into small groups, generally consisting of six people.
Members of each group were asked to deliberate on three of the most controversial issues of the day: Should states allow same-sex couples to enter into civil
unions? Should employers engage in affirmative action by giving a preference
to members of traditionally disadvantaged groups? Should the United States
sign an international treaty to combat climate change?
As the experiment was designed, some groups were “liberal” and others were
“conservative”—drawn from residents of Boulder and Colorado Springs. (There
was no mixing.) It is widely known that Boulder tends to be left of center and
that Colorado Springs tends to be right of center. The groups were carefully
screened to ensure that their members conformed to these stereotypes. People
were asked to state their opinions individually and anonymously (by writing
them down in private) both before and after fifteen minutes of group discussion,
and also to try to reach a public verdict before making their final anonymous
statements as individuals. I was especially interested in what would happen to
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their anonymous statements of their views. How would those change as a result
of a brief period of conversation with like-minded others?
The results were both simple and disturbing. In almost every group, members
ended up with more extreme positions after they spoke with one another. They
became more extreme both in their public statements during group deliberations, and their private statements, offered anonymously afterward. To offer a
little more detail: Discussion made same-sex unions more popular among liberals; discussion made such unions less popular among conservatives. Liberals
favored an international treaty to control climate change before discussion; they
favored it more strongly after discussion. Conservatives were neutral on that
treaty before discussion; they strongly opposed it after discussion.
Mildly favorable toward affirmative action before discussion, liberals became
strongly favorable toward affirmative action after discussion. Firmly negative
about affirmative action before discussion, conservatives became even more
negative about affirmative action after discussion.
As a result of the experiment, both liberal and conservative groups became
more ideologically homogeneous. Even in their anonymous statements, group
members showed far more consensus after discussion than before. It follows
that discussion helped to widen the rift between liberals and conservatives on
all three issues. Before discussion, some liberal groups were, on some issues,
fairly close to some conservative groups. The result of discussion was to divide
them far more sharply.
These findings are case studies in group polarization, which occurs when likeminded people engaged in discussion with one another end up thinking a more
extreme version of what they thought before they started to talk.4 Consider
some examples of the basic phenomenon, which has been found in over a
dozen nations.5 (a) A group of moderately pro-feminist women will become
more strongly pro-feminist after discussion.6 (b) After discussion, citizens
of France become more critical of the United States and its intentions with
respect to economic aid.7 (c) After discussion, whites predisposed to show racial
prejudice offer more negative responses to the question whether white racism
4.
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is responsible for conditions faced by African Americans in American cities.8
(d) After discussion, whites predisposed not to show racial prejudice offer more
positive responses to the same question.9
These findings bear of course on classroom discussions, both in person and
online. If students are inclined to a particular point of view, they might end
up more unified, more confident, and more extreme. Certainly that is the case
if the professor does not in some sense intervene. There is no question that
in some classes, again both in person and online, group polarization is the
essential pattern.
3.
Some of the most interesting work on social influences, bearing directly
on what can happen in the classroom, involves the existence of informational
and reputational “cascades.”10 A starting point is that when individuals lack a
great deal of private information (and sometimes even when they have such
information), they are attentive to the information provided by the statements
or actions of others. If A is unaware whether genetic modification of food is a
serious problem, he may be moved in the direction of alarm if B seems to think
that alarm is justified. If A and B believe that alarm is justified, C may end up
thinking so too, at least if she lacks independent information to the contrary.
If A, B, and C believe that genetic modification of food is a serious problem,
D will need a good deal of confidence to reject their shared conclusion.
The result of this process can be to produce cascade effects, as large groups
of people eventually end up believing something simply because other people
seem to believe it too. It should be clear that whether cascade effects occur may
depend on seemingly small factors, such as the initial distribution of beliefs, the
order in which people announce what they think, and people’s thresholds for
abandoning their private beliefs in deference to the views announced by others.
Though the cascade phenomenon has been discussed largely in connection
with factual judgments, the same processes are at work for judgments of value;
we can easily imagine value cascades (information-induced or otherwise) that
may well produce large-scale shifts.11 In such contexts, many people, lacking firm
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convictions of their own, may end up believing what (relevant) others seem to
believe. Changes in social attitudes toward smoking, abortion, climate change,
same-sex marriage, criminal justice, Second Amendment rights, recycling,
and sexual harassment have a great deal to do with these effects. And small
differences in initial conditions, in thresholds for abandoning private beliefs
because of reputational pressures, and in who hears what when, can lead to
major differences in outcomes.
Classrooms are full of cascades of various kinds. Most teachers have had the
experience of an initial comment, perhaps a surprising one, shifting a discussion
in an unanticipated direction, producing an apparent consensus that could not
have been anticipated in advance, that could have easily been otherwise, and
that does not, in fact, reflect the actual distribution of views among students.
4.
A number of years ago, I was walking to lunch with two colleagues. One
was white; the other was African American. Our topic was police abuse. My
white colleague said something like this: “We’re all subject to that. When I was
nineteen, a police officer stopped me and asked me for my license. No reason
at all. Just because I was young, I guess.”
My African American colleague paused and said, “Once I was driving in
town with three Black friends. We were doing nothing wrong. Two police
officers stopped us, asked us to get out of the car, shoved us against the trunk,
and drew guns on us while they kept us there for ninety minutes. I have four
other stories a lot like that. Did that ever happen to you?”
The question was rhetorical. But what kind of story is this? Is it a story of
white privilege? Maybe. But to know whether we have a case of privilege, we
need a baseline, or a theory of entitlement. It might be a privilege to receive an
undeserved tax break. Is it a privilege not to be abused by the police? We do
better to speak of inequality, and better still to speak of a system of racial caste.
If one group of people receives systematically worse treatment than another
from the police, and if what distinguishes the two groups is skin color, than we
are dealing with something like a caste system.
To white people, some aspects of that system are not visible. When our
African American colleague told his story, and then said that something similar
had happened four other times, I did not think, “Oh, I already knew that.” I
learned something.
5.
Suppose that group members have a great deal of information—enough to
produce the unambiguously right outcome if that information is elicited and
properly aggregated. Even if this is so, an obvious problem is that groups will
not perform well if they emphasize broadly shared information while neglecting
(2018), https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58086/1/73.pdf. Norm entrepreneurs have a strong
interest in promoting this mistake.
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information that is held by one or a few members. Unfortunately, countless
studies demonstrate that this regrettable result is highly likely.12
“Hidden profiles” is the technical term for accurate understandings that
groups could but do not reach. Hidden profiles are, in turn, a product of the
common-knowledge effect, through which information held by all group members
has more influence on group judgments than information held by only a few
members.13 The most obvious explanation of the effect is the simple fact that
as a statistical matter, common knowledge is more likely to be communicated
to the group. But social influences play a big role as well.
Consider a study of serious errors within working groups.14 The purpose
of the study was to see how groups collaborate to make personnel decisions.
Resumes for three candidates, applying for a position of marketing manager,
were placed before group members. The experimenters rigged the attributes of
the candidates so that one applicant was clearly the best for the job described.
Group members would learn who was best if they were able to see, and to
consider, all available information. Packets of information were given to the
subjects, each containing a subset of information from the resumes, so that each
group member had only part of the relevant information. The groups consisted
of three people, some operating face to face, some operating online.
Almost none of the deliberating groups made what was conspicuously the
right choice! The reason is simple: People failed to share their information in
a way that would permit the group to make that choice. Members tended to
share positive information about the winning candidate and negative information about the losers. They suppressed negative information about the winner
and positive information about the losers. Hence, their statements served to
“reinforce the march toward group consensus rather than add complications
and fuel debate.”15
Or consider a simulation of political elections, in which information was
parceled out to individual members about three candidates for political office,
and in which properly pooled information could have led to what was clearly
the best choice, candidate A.16 In the first condition, each member of the fourperson groups was given most of the relevant information (sixty-six percent of
the information about each candidate). In that condition, sixty-seven percent
of group members favored candidate A before discussion, and eighty-five percent did so after discussion.17 This is a clear example of sensible aggregation of
12.
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information. Groups significantly outperformed individuals, apparently because
of the exchange of information and reasons. Here, then, is a clear illustration
of the possibility that groups can aggregate what members know in a way that
produces sensible outcomes.
In the second condition, by contrast, the information that favored candidate
A was parceled out to various members of the group, so that only thirty-three
percent of information about each candidate was shared. Furthermore, as the
condition was designed, that shared information favored two unambiguously
inferior candidates, B and C. In that condition, fewer than twenty-five percent
of group members favored candidate A before discussion—a natural product of
the initial distribution of information. But if the unshared information emerged
through group discussion, and were taken seriously, the group would end up
selecting candidate A. The bad news is that number actually fell after discussion, simply because the shared information had disproportionate influence
on group members.18
In other words, groups did worse than individuals, not better, when the
information was distributed so that the key material was unshared and could
emerge only from discussion. Under those circumstances, the shared information was far more influential than the unshared information, to the detriment
of the group’s ultimate decision.
From this and many similar studies, the general conclusion is that shared
information has a far larger impact than unshared information. If everyone in a six-person
group has the same information, and if two members have information of their
own that everyone else lacks, there is a good chance that the shared information will dominate. More specifically, when most of the unshared information
is opposed to the position that is initially the most popular, that unshared
information will be omitted from the discussion—and will not have much of an
influence on what groups end up choosing.19 It follows that “group decisions
and postgroup preferences reflect the initial preferences of group members even
when the exchange of unshared information should have resulted in substantial shifts in opinion.”20
These results are best understood as a consequence of the common-knowledge
effect, by which information held by all group members has a lot more influence
on group judgments than information held by one member or a few.21 More
technically, the “‘influence of a particular item of information is directly and
positively related to the number of group members who have knowledge of
that item before the group discussion and judgment.’”22 When information is
unshared, group judgments have been found to be no more accurate than the
18.
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average of the individual judgments, even though—and this is the central point—
the groups have possession of more information than any of the individuals.23
6.
Classrooms are hardly immune to self-silencing, group polarization, cascade
effects, and hidden profiles. First: Students might self-silence because they do not
want others to see that they are confused or baffled. Or they might self-silence
because their views seem, to them, to be out of step with what most people
think. They might not want to risk the trouble that might come from conveying
those views. Or they might think if they reveal certain values, perspectives, and
experiences, they will be at risk or lose something. Second: Classrooms might
consist largely of like-minded people, or at least like-minded people might do
much of the talking, which might lead to unity, confidence, and extremism.
Third: Classrooms often show cascade effects, as a teacher or a student states
an initial position; a student agrees; another student agrees; and quickly or
eventually, the entire group converges on that position, or at least seems to do
that. In that respect, classes can show multiple equilibria. A large group might
favor position A rather than position B, even though a small shock (in the form,
perhaps, of a dissident view from the right person at the right time) might have
swung the group to position B. Fourth: Classes might not get the information
they could have and need, because those who have different or novel information do not reveal it. In fact, that happens all the time.
Some groups are less equal than others. In some law schools, for example,
people who are right of center, or who have strong religious convictions, might
think that they need to self-silence. (They might in some sense be right, given
what matters to them.) They might believe in originalism in a constitutional
law class in which originalism is taboo. They might think that Roe v. Wade was
wrong, even preposterous, and that affirmative action is unconstitutional; but
they do not say what they think. In discussions of the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments, students of color might have had perspectives or experiences that
bear on Supreme Court decisions, perhaps suggesting that the racial dimensions
have been overlooked, or that there is an equal protection dimension to which
the Court has been blind. In the face of self-silencing, a cascade might develop,
suggesting that the class as a whole believes X when many of its members reject
X in favor of Y. Hidden profiles might remain hidden.
7.
Many teachers are aware of all this, whether or not they know the social
science. They take steps to allow people to say what they think. They combat
group polarization. If a cascade seems to be starting, they elicit opposing views,
not because the cascade is necessarily wrong, but to ensure that if it prevails, it
is because of its merits, not because of social dynamics. They try to elicit hidden
profiles. These techniques are part and parcel of liberal education, understood to
23.
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entail a commitment to freedom of thought and expression, and an openness
to competing views and perspectives (including those that contest liberalism
itself). In some circles, the idea of “liberalism” is being caricatured, in such a
way as to hold it responsible for all sorts of modern ills. But liberalism entails
a respect for diverse opinions and a firm commitment to free discussion, as
well as a master commitment to human dignity. It is radically opposed to the
illiberal left (as well as the illiberal right).
In these endeavors, even the best teachers sometimes fail. Sometimes, for
example, a left-of-center orthodoxy prevails in the classroom. If so, people
who are right of center might feel silenced, even if the instructor tries hard to
encourage them to speak. Or suppose that the class is predominantly white,
and that students of color feel marginal or disrespected. If so, they might
self-silence. Good classrooms are full of an illusion of consensus. Teachers often
learn, a day later, or perhaps a year later, that some students had experiences,
perspectives, or beliefs that would have proved valuable and challenging, but
that were never voiced.
Is online education better or worse on these counts? There is no simple
answer, because everything depends on how teachers choose to teach online.
But it is clear that there are both risks and opportunities. One risk: It is easy
to make a video of what people are saying, and to make their mistakes, or their
departures from the status quo, relatively permanent. Outliers can be “canceled”
or lapidated. The fear of recording can deter people from saying anything at all.
At the same time, online teaching can be used to combat some of the baleful
effects of self-silencing, group polarization, and cascade effects. Faculty members
can take advantage of rapid surveys, which can be anonymous. A teacher can ask
some question and see the actual distribution of views within a class; surprises
are likely. The fact that people are not in a literal room with one another can be
helpful. It might soften some of the social pressures. People might well be able
to feel braver, or safer, if they are in a room of their own. A great deal depends
on how the teacher manages the show.
8.
Two years ago, in a course on social change, I decided to have a session on
#MeToo. Several students asked if they could skip the in-person class and just
watch the recorded session. They said that being there would be traumatic for
them. They said that they would feel safer watching it alone.
That request raised a deep question: How should we think about the question of “safety”? Here is a very partial answer. People should feel safe to say
what they think, so long as it is relevant (and so long as it does not violate basic
norms of civility, properly defined24). Online education presents unprecedented
opportunities for overcoming self-silencing, and some of the baleful consequences
of group polarization, cascade effects, and hidden profiles. It can also strike a
24.

I am intentionally bracketing a large question here.

214

Journal of Legal Education

blow, or two, or more, against the caste like features of American society, and
against the marginalization of reasonable people of diverse kinds.

